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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY LAW- ACTIONABLE UNSEAWORTHINESS NOT PRE-
CLUDED AS A MATTER OF LAW.- Libelant, a longshoreman, was
injured when an automobile fell while he and other longshoremen
were unloading it from the hold of a ship. At the time of the
accident, a single purchase 1 rigged with sound rope was being
employed. The district court, in dismissing the libel, relied upon a
dichotomy between unseaworthiness and operational negligence. Con-
sidering precedent binding, the court determined that, as a matter
of law, a condition of unseaworthiness did not exist. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in reversing and remanding for
new trial, held that the trial court erroneously regarded itself as
bound to apply the operational negligence doctrine and stated that
a finding of actionable unseaworthiness could not be precluded
as a matter of law. Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149
(2d Cir. 1966).
The warranty of seaworthiness imposes an absolute liability
upon shipowners for injuries incurred by seamen and longshoremen
while doing work traditionally performed by seamen when the injury
is caused by a condition found to be "not reasonably fit." The
doctrine's origins lie in the obligation. of the shipowner to provide
a safe working place for his crew. This duty was rigorously im-
posed since seamen could not "quit the vessel at sea or object to
the circumstances surrounding the work commanded." 2 Under
normal circumstances the hazards of the sea were great, and
imperfections in the ship could greatly increase these dangers.3
Among the earliest cases recognizing this duty of the shipowner
were The Moslem 4 and Dixon v. The Cyrus,' wherein seamen who
refused to embark on unseaworthy vessels were held entitled to their
wages and immune from prosecution for desertion. At this time,
however, seamen could not recover damages for personal injuries
2 A single purchase is a single length of manila rope attached to the wire
fall on the boom which lifted the automobiles. A double purchase consists
of two pulleys and two lengths of rope. The use of a double purchase, while
making the rigging stronger, decreases the speed of the operation.
22 NoRRis, TnE. LAW OF SF-mEN § 610 (1962).
3 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 557 (1960) (dissenting
opinion).
4 17 Fed. Cas. 894 (No. 9875) (S.D.N.Y. 1846).
5 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (No. 3930) (D. Pa. 1789).
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suffered as a result of the unseaworthiness of the vessel; 6 their
remedy was limited to maintenance and cure.'
In 1903, the landmark Supreme Court decision, The Osceola,8
gave injured seamen an effective remedy against the ship. Although
the Court need not have discussed the question, its dictum regarding
a shipowner's liability upon a finding of unseaworthiness lies at
the heart of present-day maritime personal injury actions. The
theory of unseaworthiness was the basis of much litigation following
The Osceola. However, with the passage of the Jones Act in 1920,
emphasis was shifted to the existence of a cause of action in
negligenceY
The Jones Act'10 created a remedy for seamen for injuries
which were proximately caused by the negligence of the employer
or his shipmaster, officers, agents or employees." Under the act,
a seaman was given the right to a jury trial and to bring his suit
in courts other than admiralty.'1  Additionally, the use of the
"fellow servant" rule as a bar to an action was abolished. 1 3 Further-
more, the draftsmen of the Jones Act followed the traditional
principle that the contributory negligence of a seaman would not
bar his recovery. 14  It should be noted that recovery could be
obtained under the Jones Act though the ship and its appurtenant
appliances were sound.
In 1944, the United States Supreme Court took a major step
in the development of the unseaworthiness doctrine. In Mahnich
v. Southern S.S. Co.,'5 the Court held that an act of negligence
by a ship's officer could create a condition of unseaworthiness. A
seaman was injured when the staging upon which he was standing
gave way. A defective rope had been used to support the structure.
The Court held that the negligence of the mate and the boatswain
in failing to observe the defect "could not relieve the [shipowner]
: * . of the duty to furnish a seaworthy staging." 16 Liability was
imposed despite the shipowner's lack of knowledge that an un-
seaworthy condition existed, and despite the fact that sound rope,
6 Nopus, MmAsu n PERsoNAL INJmUIs § 19 (2d ed. 1966).
7 Ibid.
s 189 U.S. 158 (1903).9 Nous, op. cit. msPra note 6.
10 Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
See GiLuoR & BLAcr, ADMIRALTY 250-51 (1957).
1Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 35 (1926).
12 Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
3 Nopms, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 21. The Jones Act expressly incor-
porated the rights and remedies granted to railroad employees under the
Federal Employees Liability Act. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat.
1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
14 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 429 (1939) ; The Max
Morris, 137 U.S. 34 (1890).
'1 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
'1 Mahnlich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103 (1944).
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which could have cured the condition, was available. It was
stated that "the seaman, in the performance of his duties, is not
deemed to assume the risk of unseaworthy appliances." Nor, said
the Court, does the presence of sound rope on board, excuse the
owner's duty to furnish a sound staging.1 7
The Mahnich decision substantially affected the law in maritime
personal injury cases. Prior to Mahnich, operational negligence on
the part of an officer or crew member gave rise only to a Jones
Act cause of action. After the decision, it appeared that no
amount of negligence on the part of the master, the officer in
charge or a fellow crew member was fatal to the plaintiff's cause
of action provided only that he could find some handhold of unsea-
worthiness to cling to.'8 The gates were thus opened to the
voluminous number of unseaworthiness claims that followed.
1 9
An important question which was not discussed in Mahnich was
the applicability of the unseaworthiness doctrine to shoreside per-
sonnel doing the work of seamen. Previously, in The Max Morris,20
the work of longshoremen had been recognized as maritime service.
However, it remained for the Supreme Court, in Seas Shipping Co.
v. Sieracki,21 to apply the doctrine of unseaworthiness to longshore-
men. The Court stated that the liability imposed for a breach of
the warranty of seaworthiness was not limited by "conceptions of
negligence," nor was it contractual in character. The duty to
provide a seaworthy vessel extended "to all within the range of its
humanitarian policy."'22 Mahnich and Sieracki unequivocally pointed
out the absolute liability which would be imposed upon shipowners
once it was found that the personal injuries of a seaman or a
longshoreman were proximately caused by a condition of un-
seaworthiness.
23
Subsequent to Sieracki, a doctrine based on relinquishment of
control was adopted by a number of circuits.24 Under this rule,
the owner of a vessel was absolved from liability when he re-
linquished control of a portion of his ship to a stevedoring company
which was to load or unload. The owner's duty to provide a
17 Ibid.
is GILORE & BLACK, Op. cit. supra note 10, at 320.
19 See id. at 317-20.
20 The Max Morris, supra note 14.
21328 U.S. 85 (1946).
22 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1946). Accord,
Norfleet v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 355 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1966); Petterson v.
Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S.
396 (1954).23 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, supra note 22, at 90; Mahnich v. South-
ern S.S. Co., supra note 16, at 99.24 E.g., Lopez v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 201 F.2d 418 (3d Cir.
1953); Lauro v. United States, 162 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1947).
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seaworthy vessel as to the part of the ship over which control
had been relinquished extended only to the time of surrender. 5
However, this exception was severely limited when in Alaska S.S.
Co. v. Petterson,8 the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion,
affirmed an opinion of the ninth circuit overruling the doctrine.
Chief Judge Denman of the circuit court had held that the absolute
and nondelegable duty of shipowners to provide a safe ship was
inconsistent with the "relinquishment of control" doctrine. Petter-
son, it would seem, re-emphasized the nondelegability of liability
for unseaworthiness, regardless of whether the condition is brought
about by the employees of the shipowner or those of his contractor.2 7
In the 1956 case of Grillea v. United States,2 8 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals interpreted the doctrine of unseaworthiness
so as to allow a seaman or a longshoreman to recover for injuries
caused by an unseaworthy condition which he had created by his own
negligent acts.
The question of when an act of negligence by a seaman or a
longshoreman turns into a condition of unseaworthiness was raised
in Grillea. In that case, the court held that enough time had elapsed
between the placing of the wrong hatch cover over a pad-eye by
the libelant and his companion and the occurrence of the libelant's
injuries, to create an unseaworthy condition. 29 The Griilea decision
was subsequently cited by the Supreme Court in a decision which
held that liability for a temporary unseaworthy condition is no
different from that imposed when the condition is permanent.30
A major problem in this area is the difficulty in distinguishing
between operational negligence and unseaworthiness. A number of
second circuit decisions have endeavored to settle this problem.
In many of the cases it was found that the libelant's injuries were
caused by operational negligence. Two such leading decisions
are Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co. 31 and Spinelli v. Isthrmian
S.S. Co. -3 2  In both cases the injuries were incurred when equip-
ment, otherwise sound, broke or malfunctioned due to overloading.
Similarly, in both cases the appellate court affirmed the decisions
of the district courts. It is important to note that in neither case
did the court of appeals preclude a finding of unseaworthiness.
Rather, it was merely held that the decisions of the district courts
were not clearly erroneous. Massa v. C.A. Venezuelan Navigaci6n 33
25 NoRRis, op. cit. sapra note 6, at § 24.
26 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
27 NoRs, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 24.
2s 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956).
29 Id. at 922.
30 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
31 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 840 (1962).
32 326 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1964).
33 332 F.2d 779 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964).
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is another case in which operational negligence was held to be
the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. In that case longshoremen
improperly used seaworthy equipment. Plaintiff was injured
when his co-workers failed to insert lifting tongs into the proper
slots in the pallets they were unloading. The court, affirming the
district court, held that the ship was not rendered unseaworthy
by the longshoremen's acts.3 4 Equally persuasive are the second
circuit decisions wherein contrary results were obtained.
Most recently, in Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Co.35 and
Norfleet v. Isthmian Lines, Inc.,3 6 the circuit court again affirmed
lower court determinations of unseaworthiness. In the former,
plaintiff's injuries were the result of improper use of seaworthy
equipment. There the longshoremen used an open "S" hook to
lower a one ton steel ladder into a hold. When the bottom of the
ladder reached the floor of the hold the line slacked off and the
hook slipped allowing the ladder to fall. The court distinguished
Puddu, Massa and Spinelli stating that in those cases, transitory
situations which had not yet ripened into unseaworthiness were
involved.3 7  However, here the use of the apparatus took a sub-
stantial amount of time, so that the apparatus had become part
of the ship's equipment.38 The dissent, arguing for a more restricted
concept of unseaworthiness, would allow a recovery only when it
could be shown that there was a defect in the equipment used
and then, only if safe equipment were not available.39
In Norfleet, a piece of equipment, a pad-eye collar, broke and
caused the rigging to fall and injure the plaintiff. The circuit
court held:
where the failure of a furnished appurtenance, aboard ship, is dramatically
obvious, as for example where a piece of equipment breaks, the inference
of unseaworthiness is quite strong .... [T] he mere fact that the
failure occurs is sufficient evidence to support a finding of unsea-
worthiness.40
The distinction between Norfleet and Puddu is that in the latter
the court found that the equipment broke as a result of plaintiff's
negligent practice, while in Norfleet there was no finding of negli-
gence in the use of the equipment.
It is apparent from the court's holding in Skibinski that the
problem of determining when sufficient time has elapsed to create
34Id. at 781.
s5 360 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1966).
36 355 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1966).
37 Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 360 F.2d 539, 542 (2d Cir. 1966).
n Ibid.
39M. at 543-44.4 0 Norfleet v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., supra note 22, at 362.
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a condition of unseaworthiness was considered by the court, but
no general rule was put forth. This problem arose again in
Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Transp. Co.41  There a long-
shoreman assigned to hold an aluminum ladder being used by
fellow workers, entering and exiting from a hold, temporarily
left the ladder unsecured. A strong wind caused the ladder to fall
and strike the plaintiff. The court held that a condition of un-
seaworthiness had been created. Commenting on the distinctions
made by other courts between an unsafe condition-unseaworthiness
-and an act of negligence, the court stated: "one does not have
to be unduly cynical to look askance at this distinction, for every
act of negligence, no matter how short-lived, creates an unsafe
condition for those exposed to it." 42 The Reid decision would
appear to follow the rationale developed in other circuits which deny
recognition to an operational negligence - unseaworthiness
dichotomy.43
As has been shown, the second circuit, in most instances, has
recognized the distinction between unseaworthiness and operational
negligence. In the principal case, libelant, Radovich, was injured
while unloading automobiles from the hold of the respondent's vessel.
The trial court found that a single purchase was adequate to lift
and unload smaller cars but inadequate to lift larger ones. This
inadequacy caused the rope to break when a heavier car was
lifted. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, after discussing prior
case law, stated: "if anything emerges from these cases other than
the difficulty of applying the act-condition (or operational negligence-
unseaworthiness) dichotomy, it is that the findings of the trier
of fact should be left undisturbed, if the law to be applied to the
facts is properly understood." 44
However, Judge Feinberg, writing for the majority, indicated
that the law had been incorrectly determined by the lower court.
The district judge considered the decisions in Puddu and Spinelli
factually indistinguishable from Radovich.4" As a result, it was
held, as a matter of law, that a finding of operational negligence
was required. Judge Feinberg's majority opinion interpreted
Puddu and Spinelli as merely upholding decisions of the lower
courts which were not clearly erroneous and not as precluding a
finding of unseaworthiness. 48 Moreover, the majority argued, the
41340 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1965).
42Id. at 37.
43 E.g., Ferrante v. Swedish American Lines, 331 F.2d 571 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 801 (1964); Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113
(4th Cir. 1964). But see Beeler v. Alaska Aggregate Corp., 336 F.2d 108
(9th Cir. 1964); Billeci v. United States, 298 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962);
Titus v. The Santorini, 258 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1958).44 Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. J1966).
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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facts of Radovich more closely resembled those in Strika v. Nether-
lands Ministry of Traffic 4 and Skibinski,8 wherein determinations
of unseaworthiness were sustained.49
The Court suggested, that upon retrial, the district court could
determine precisely what the act of operational negligence in the
principal case was, and whether that act had come to a stop before
the injury occurred. The majority, cognizant of the difficulties
of this area, suggested, as an aid to lower courts, that a dis-
tinction be made between "an unsafe -plan of operation, which creates
a dangerous condition from the beginning of its execution, and a
faulty execution, of a proper plan." 50 Applying this guide to
Radovich, the Court indicated that if the plan initially adopted
by the longshoremen, i.e., to lift both the small and the large
automobiles with a single purchase, was faulty, then a condition
of unseaworthiness was created when the plan was put into
operation. If, however, the plan was adequate but the manner
in which it was carried out was improper, this would be an act
of operational negligence.
The dissenting opinion espoused the rationale of the dissent
in Skibinski. The majority was characterized as "toiling to
impose" liability upon an innocent shipowner, thereby providing
a source of a substantial recovery for a longshoreman, whose relief
would otherwise be monetarily limited by the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.51 The dissent, further contended
that to differentiate between operational negligence and unseaworth-
iness is to put "our imprimatur on trivial, meaningless and con-
fusing distinctions." 52  It was believed that only through additional
legislation could the injustices confronting shipowners be remedied,
since judicial decisions had only served to obscure the lawA3
In light of the majority opinion, it was difficult for the dissent to
imagine any act of operational negligence which could not, "by
clever advocacy and hair-line distinctions render the shipowner
liable for unseaworthiness.
54
The guide suggested by the majority is clearly an attempt
to aid the courts in making the "hair-line" decisions which will
be required if the courts are to pursue the practice of distinguishing
between operational negligence and unseaworthiness. Adopting
47 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951), where
the court affirmed a jury determination that the manner in which two
bridles, used to lift a heavy hatch cover, were attached rendered the vessel
unseaworthy.
48 360 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1966).
49 Supra note 44, at 153.
50 Ibid.
5144 Stat. 1424-46 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
52 Supra note 44, at 153 (dissenting opinion).
53 Ibid.54 Supra note 44, at 154 (dissenting opinion).
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this suggestion, it will no longer be necessary for a court to
determine whether sufficient time had elapsed so that the negligent
act had come to rest, thereby creating a condition of unseaworthiness.
Under the rule proposed in Radovich, the trial court need only
determine whether the plan used was faulty. If the answer is in
the affirmative, then a condition of unseaworthiness existed the
moment the plan was put into operation.
It does not appear, however, that the rule developed by the
majority will facilitate solving the operational negligence-unsea-
worthiness problem. The rule creates, in many cases, equally
difficult problems of determining what the plan was and whether
a certain act was a departure from the plan. In cases such as
Massa and Skibinski the determination will be relatively easy. In
the former there was certainly no plan to negligently place the
lifting tongs, while in the latter there was obviously a plan to
use a particular method of operation that can be shown to be in-
adequate as a consequence of its subsequent failure and infliction
of harm. However, in a case such as Spineli the question becomes
more difficult. We can ask if the order given by the head stevedore
to increase the size of loads being hauled from the hold of the
ship was a negligent departure from the original plan which con-
templated lighter loads, or if it was the adoption of a new plan
which thus created a condition of unseaworthiness. The difficulty
may be observed again in a consideration of Pudd. Did the plan
used in unloading the vessel contemplate the act which created
excessive horizontal pressure on the booms and caused them to
buckle, or were these acts an innovation of the winchman? Ad-
ditionally, we must also determine whose plan is to be considered.
As an illustration, suppose that the head stevedore formulates a safe
plan and orders that the job be done pursuant to it, but the winch-
man proceeds upon an unsafe plan of his own. Were the acts
of the winchman a departure from a sound plan or the execution
of a faulty plan? Numerous complicated problems can be
foreseen.
It is important to note that the proposed test is not available
for use by the trial court in distinguishing operational negligence
from unseaworthiness, as a inatter of law, but rather is put forth to
provide criteria upon which a factual determination of the issues
can be made. Re-emphasizing this point, the Court was careful
to state that upon retrial it would not necessarily reverse a de-
termination of operative negligence by a trial court not mistaken
as to its power under the applicable law, despite its belief that a
condition of unseaworthiness existed.55
It seems that, in the final analysis, Radovich has made only
a small contribution toward the delineation of the distinctive ele-
GG Supra note 44, at 153.
19671]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ments present in operational negligence and unseaworthiness sit-
uations.5 6 In addition, it appears that the courts have completely
disregarded the position of the shipowner. As stated in the dissent
in Skibinski, the courts are using shipowners as a conduit for im-
posing the liability on the stevedore companies, which are regularly
impleaded.57 However, where the stevedore company is judgment
proof, the innocent shipowner must suffer the judgment without
any effective recovery over.
An aim of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act is to limit the liability of the longshoreman's employer.
Section 905 provides that the employer's liability under the act is
exclusive and in place of all other liability."" It is possible that
the courts are motivated by a belief that the compensation, which
ranges downward from a maximum of two-thirds of the employee's
average weekly wage for total disability, is inadequate ;59 however,
the remedy provided by statute is clear and it is beyond the scope
of the courts' functions to attempt to circumvent this legislation.
It appears that it is time for a legislative review of this entire area,
emphasizing the interrelationships between the unseaworthiness
doctrine and the Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Without such
legislative action the Supreme Court should examine the ill-defined
distinctions of the unseaworthiness doctrine in the same context.
M
CRIMINAL LAW - SEARCH AND SEIZURE: - NEW YORK'S
"STOP AND FRIsK" LAw HELD NOT VIOLATIvE OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT DEsPITE LAcK OF "PROBABLE CAUSE" REQUIRE-
MENT.- Appellant was apprehended in an apartment house by a
tenant, an off-duty policeman, who had observed appellant and his
companion tiptoeing around the hallway. Upon receiving an unsat-
isfactory answer as to their presence in the hallway, the officer
"frisked" the appellant for a weapon. He felt something hard
"which could have been a knife," and withdrew from appellant's
pocket an opaque plastic envelope which, upon examination, was
found to contain burglar's tools. This evidence was used to secure
an indictment against appellant for unlawful possession of burglar's
tools. Appellant's pretrial motion to suppress the evidence as
constitutionally inadmissible was denied and he was convicted upon
5 8 The court carefully indicated that no determination had been made as
to the validity of the distinction.57 Supra note 37, at 544.
58 This is provided so that the employer secures payment for his injured
employees. Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat.
1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
59 Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1427
(1927), 33 U.S.C. § 908(a) (1964).
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